| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-01 | Require a second factor for elevation, not for holding admin | erdgeist | |
| 2026-08-01 | Require a fresh second factor for user management | erdgeist | |
| Administrative actions are gated behind a 30-minute elevation window: creating and retiring accounts, editing roles, clearing a second factor. Reading the list is not gated, and content work is untouched. elevated? is tied to is_admin?, so losing the role closes the window at once. The window opens when the second factor verifies at login, so an admin heading straight for user management is already elevated, and closes on logout with the other session state. Five wrong codes end the session, mirroring the login challenge. users#update carries no elevation filter, since self-service reaches it; the role field is gated in user_params instead and fails closed. | |||
| 2026-07-24 | Give all sessions a uniform absolute lifetime of one week | erdgeist | |
| Enforced at restore via a login-time stamp, written only at genuine logins so the limit stays absolute rather than sliding. The cookie name rotation logs everyone out once at deploy. Second-factor users are deliberately not treated worse than password-only ones. | |||
| 2009-02-15 | * initial commit of the stripped restful-authentication | simon | |
| * http basic auth and login from cookie have been removed * no it does not work yet, it's so f*cking secure, it won't even let legitimate users login | |||
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index : cccms | |
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